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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
I. INTRODUCTION  
As our lives become more and more regulated by the powers that be, it is pertinent that there 
be acknowledgement of the people that are subject to these rules. When government attempts 
to regulate aspects of human lives, these regulations exist alongside the embedded mores of 
communities and the resulting social constructs.1 For this reason, one cannot dismiss the 
relevance of informal practices when discussing the formal sector and the prospect of 
regulation of such. 
 
With the gradual ‘financialising’ of those previously thought of as ‘unbanked’, there is a 
steady move toward increased interaction with credit, savings and financial transactions in 
general.2 Elizabeth Hull notes that as this trajectory continues, there has been a shift in efforts 
to provide financial services to those who fall outside of the formal sector. 3 The enthusiasm 
of such efforts has however differed between the informal and formal sector.  
 
Formal financial service provision for the poor is still severely lacking, due to the systemic 
flaws in financial institutions, which include high transaction costs, the need for collateral 
and stringent regulations.4 As a result of these inadequacies, informal financial services have 
flourished as they aim to mitigate the flaws associated with the formal sectors, in the hopes of 
fostering inclusion and pursuing economic sustainability.5 
 
The Village Bank is one such informal financial service. The term ‘Village Bank’ is one 
widely used in the economic and anthropological literature to describe a member-based bank, 
usually operating at the intersection of the formal and informal sectors. I will use this 
terminology throughout my dissertation to reflect the concept as framed in the social science 
literature. In part 1.4 below, I give further details as to a possible definition of the Village 
Banks concept.  
																																																						
1 S Falke Moore ‘The legislative dismantling of a colonial and an apartheid state’ (2011) 7 Annual Review of 
law and social science.  
2 D James ‘Women use their strength in the house: savings clubs in an Mpumalanga Village’ (2015) 41 Journal 
of Southern African Studies 5. 
3 E Hull ‘Banking in the Bush: waiting for credit in South Africa’s rural economy’ (2012) 82 Africa: Journal of 
the International African Institute 169. 
4 P Mashigo & K Humayun ‘Village Banks: a financial strategy for developing the South African poor 
household’ (2016) 11 Banks and Bank systems 8. 
5 Ibid at 10.  
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In practice, unlike formal institutions, Village Banks tend to build on the notions of 
solidarity, community and trust. Village Banks are organised and owned by members who 
aim to provide financial services at village level, bridging the gap between the formal and 
informal banking sector. 6 Ultimately Village Banks present opportunities to raise capital, 
accumulate savings and keep cash secure.7 
 
There have been haphazard attempts by government to intervene and regulate this sector. One 
such attempt has been dubbed as ‘regulation by exemption’,8 which is what was foreseen by 
the ‘common bond’ exemption of these institutions from the Banks Act No.94, 1990.9 
Additionally, the regulating bodies initially set up to serve Village Banks have either 
collapsed or have been rendered inoperative.10 
 
Provisions in the Mutual Banks Act,11 Cooperative Act,12 Cooperative Banks Act13 and 
bodies like the Registrar of Cooperatives have attempted to bring Village Banks under their 
sphere of influence. These attempts have however fallen on deaf ears and for the most part 
have been unsuccessful as Village Banks continue to run according to their own modus 
operandi.  
 
Such failures can be attributed to government’s lack of cognisance of the fact that these 
organisations are heterogeneous, which means that a one-size-fits-all approach to oversight 
and regulation will not suffice.14 Because these entities are by their very nature informal, so 
some argue that it is impossible to regulate them without damaging this intrinsic 
characteristic.15 It is however, necessary for these institutions to be given statutory 
recognition to ensure legitimacy, sustainability and foster accountability.16  
																																																						
6 Coetzee & Cross ‘The role of community banks in South Africa: Can it contribute to improve access to 
financial services for the poor?’ (2002) Working paper: Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and 
Rural Development. University of Pretoria, South Africa.  
7 GA Jones & A Dallimore ‘Wither participatory banking? Experiences with village banks in South Africa’ 
(2009) 21 European Journal of Development Research 347. 
8 FinMark Trust ‘Third Tier Banking Report: A review of the capacity, lessons learned and way forward for 
member-based financial institutions in South Africa’ (2003) available at http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/ThirdTierBanking.pdf, accessed on 25 April 2017. Page 31. 
9 Government Notice 367, published in the Government Gazette 18741 of 10 March 1998. 
10 Jones & Dallimore (2009) op cit note 7. 
11 124 of 1993. 
12 14 of 2005. 
13 40 of 2007. 
14 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 31. 
15 Ibid at 40. 
16 Ibid.  
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Regulation thus must be done while ensuring the fabric of Village Banks is upheld. The 
regulation of Village Banks can only be done with community ‘buy in’ as it is unlikely that 
any sort of regulation will succeed when imposed on a community.17 The lived reality of 
these institutions must be a guiding factor and one cannot focus wholly on the banking aspect 
of these institutions, as this has resulted in the regulation of Village Banks has being ill-
applied, therefore, they basically remain unregulated.18  
 
II. RESEARCH QUESTION   
The main question that this dissertation will to investigate and answer is: ‘With respect to 
Village Banks, is there a need to move from informal self-regulated arrangements to more 
formal and regulated institutions via increased government intervention in the sector?’  
 
In making this determination, the following sub-questions will be asked: “What is the role of 
community in contracting?”, “To what extent has the formal banking sector reached the 
‘unbanked’?” and “What is the role of informal sector practices in the regulating of Village 
Banks?”. 
 
By reviewing extensive sources, this dissertation seeks to use desktop study to examine 
secondary data to deduce both the theory and common practice regarding Village Banks. 
Furthermore, by drawing on ethnographic accounts, this dissertation will provide more 
nuanced research that considers the lived experiences of those who are embedded in the 
communities that utilise these structures. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research for this dissertation is entirely desktop and library based. By reviewing extensive 
sources, this dissertation will examine secondary data to deduce both the theory and common 
practice regarding Village Banks. In doing this, an extensive range of sources has been used, 
which include, but are not limited to books, policy papers, journal articles, statutes, annual 
reports as well as newspaper articles and internet sources where they are relevant.  
 
																																																						
17 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 17.  
18 Ibid at 18.  
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For the purposes of this dissertation qualitative research is imperative to comprehend what 
happens ‘on the ground’. Research in the field of Village Banks is somewhat limited and the 
qualitative studies that do exist, are few and far between. Currently available ethnographic 
accounts, to provide more nuanced research that considers the lived experiences of those who 
are embedded in the communities that utilise these structures. 
 
IV. DEFINITIONS  
a) Microfinance Financial Services  
In South Africa, the waters are further muddied by the fact that there are varying institutions, 
both formal and informal, that mimic certain functions of the Village Bank. Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ROSCA’s), Stokvels, Burial Societies, Mutual Banks, 
Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRA’s) and Financial Service Co-
operatives are all methods invoked by South Africans to engage in informal banking practices 
that serve a similar (but not always the same) purpose.19 
 
These institutions can be described as having a ‘savings first’ function in that they are 
member owned, capitalised and driven.20 Members raise the start-up and development 
capital, and because the members own these institutions, they are, legitimised, offering 
decentralised bank-like services, which are organised around local community structures.21 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation it may be helpful to briefly distinguish between these 
entities to fully conceptualise the notion of a Village Bank. Because there is often overlap in 
the function and organisation of these entities because it is easy to group them under one 
metaphorical microfinance banner. However, one must realise that there is a disjuncture 
between academic definitions and what exists in reality because these practices are far more 
nuanced than one can put on paper.  
 
b) ROSCA 
A ROSCA, although differing in size, nature and purpose, has the basic element that 
members agree to pool money from which funds are distributed to members allocating one 
																																																						
19 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 1. 
20 A Dallimore “Banking on the Poor: Savings, Poverty and Access to Financial Services in Rural South 
Africa." (PhD, London School of Economics 2013) at 59. 
21 Ibid. 
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member per meeting at to receive the entire pool.22 These are local institutions, which are 
formed by family members, friends or neighbours resulting in community ties and personal 
relationships that are used to ensure compliance with the rules of the ROSCA.23 
 
One such ROSCA that is local to South Africa, is dubbed a Stokvel.24 This is an informal 
solidarity self-help group that offers numerous financial and support services to its members, 
such as opportunity for credit and saving.25 These groups are voluntary and are managed 
locally by their members, with an oversight body, the National Stokvel Association of South 
Africa (NASASA), that represents their interests on a national level. 26 
 
A burial society has been described as a Stokvel, which has evolved into a more dignified 
institution that operates at both an informal and commercial level.27 Those with relational ties 
can establish these entities informally in order to provide for the costs of a honourable burial 
by pooling resources and making monthly contributions in order to save for the high costs 
associated with these ceremonies.28  
 
These entities also have an insurance function, given that it ensures that upon the death of 
oneself or a family member, there are funds that will become available to pay specifically for 
funeral costs.29 A burial society can also operate at a formal level where members do not 
know each other and the funds are managed by an oversight body. Members pay a joining fee 
in order to sign up as well as their monthly contributions.30 Whether formal or informal, this 
allows one to save for the occurrence of a certain future event upon which a pay-out will 
occur.   
 
c) Mutual Bank 
Mutual Banks, as regulated by the Mutual Banks Act,31 are sui generis entities that are 
constituted by interest-bearing shares.32 These banks require R10 million as start-up capital33 
																																																						
22 B Armendariz & J Morduch The Economics of Microfinance (2007) 59. 
23 Ibid at 60. 
24 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 4. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid at 5. 
27 Ibid at 9. 
28 Ibid at 9. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.	
31 Op cit note 11. 
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and aim to bridge the divide between formal and informal banks, providing more regulation 
than an informal bank but allowing protection afforded by mutual membership.34 It must 
however be noted that due to the high start-up capital required, they are very unpopular and at 
present only two are operative in South Africa.35 
 
d) Financial Service Co-operatives (FSC’s) 
An FSC is an entity, created and regulated in terms of the Co-operatives Act.36 The act, in 
Schedule 1, defines a FSC as an entity with the main objective of providing financial services 
to its members.37 This definition is an overarching one which is said to include several 
financial service institutions such as credit unions, co-operative banks, savings and credit co-
operatives or any other financial services. 38  
 
 In terms of FSC’s, further confusion is created because initially Village Banks were 
registered as one of these entities in terms of the Co-operatives Act and as a result were 
subjected to its legislation.39 This meant that these banks fell under the auspices of the 
Financial Service Association (FSA), which was established to develop a regulatory 
framework for the operating of these institutions.40  
 
e) Village Banks 
Village Banks, as they are colloquially known, because they differ in organisation, structure 
and size have proven to be difficult to define methodically. Instead academics have tended to 
attribute over-arching characteristics to these institutions. Words such as self-regulating,41 
community banks,42 semi-formal43 and democratic44 have been frequently invoked to 
describe Village Banks and their underlying tenet. Although there has been much academic 
chatter around the topic, it remains that most authors have failed to define these entities with 
																																																																																																																																																																								
32 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 19. 
33 Op cit note 11 at s48. 
34 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 20.  
35 Ibid at 20.  
36 Op cit note 12. 
37 Ibid at Sched 1 Part 3. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Mashigo & Humayun (2016) op cit note 4 at 9.  
41 Hatch ‘A Brief Primer on FINCA’ available at 
http://www.haas.berkley.edu/haasglobal/events_microfinanceos.html, accessed on 20 April 2017. 
42 Coetzee & Cross (2002) op cit note 6 at at 347. 
43Ibid.  
44 Hatch op cit note 41. 
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any sort of precision. This failure has resulted in much confusion as to what these banks 
encompass and how they are run.  
 
In other jurisdictions, these banks tend to be influenced by both the Grameen Bank and 
FINCA models.45 The Grameen Bank, established in Bangladesh, is a commercial bank that 
is based on the notion of social capital and group lending. Individuals are divided into groups 
of five people who are said to provide both peer support and peer pressure in their dealings 
with microfinance, introducing a whole new dynamic to the banking structure.46 
 
The FINCA Village Banks, identified by Johan Hatch,47 relies on a solidarity lending 
business model.48 The banks descried loosely mirror the entities that tend to exist in South 
Africa today. Solidarity lending means that each member undertakes to serve as a guarantor 
for their cohorts and so social pressures are used to ensure that loans and memberships are 
paid.49 The essence of this is that the bank is funded and managed by its members.  
 
The Village Bank Model, which was recognised by the International Fund for Agriculture 
(IFAD) in 1994, has been termed as institutions that are self-sustaining in that they are 
financed, managed and owned by their members.50 Legally speaking, these banks have been 
described as falling on a spectrum between a shareholding company and a co-operative 
however it is submitted that the route of a co-operative is preferred as it is more flexible in its 
voting rights and has a simple framework whereby members are only expected to buy one 
share at a nominal fee. 51  
 
Ultimately, these banks, as they exist in South Africa, may be defined as institutions that 
encapsulate group lending by relying on group responsibility as an innovation to secure the 
																																																						
45 Armendariz & Morduch (2007) op cit note 22 at 12. 
46 Grameen Research Inc ‘Grameen Methodology’ available at http://grameenresearch.org/grameen-
methodology-2, accessed on 20 May 2017. 
47 Hatch op cit note 41.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 M Nigrini ‘Empowering Poor rural villages through the provision of financial services by means of financial 
service cooperatives: A preliminary investigation into financial service cooperatives in South Africa.’ Paper 
read at International Jubilee Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa, 13-14 September 2001. 




df , accessed on 29 May 2017.  
51 Ibid.   
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repayments of loans.52 They are mutually owned, democratically governed and linked to a 
nearby formal bank where deposits are kept.53 The thinking behind these institutions is that 
they reduce transaction costs, which are borne by all the members rather than the individual 
and the savings are protected. 54 
 
The above are however overarching descriptions that could be attributed to all the entities 
that have been outlined previously. A more precise definition would be that this is a vehicle 
to provide financial services to both the rural and urban poor, who, without these banks, 
would not have access to such services. These Banks provide that their members, aside from 
holding savings accounts, buy one share in these entities which is used to capitalise these 
entities. In turn, they are given a vote that can be used to hold those in charge accountable.  
 
By requiring a ‘buy-in’ members feel as if they have a stake in the bank, over and above that 
which they hold in a savings account. This feeling of ownership is integral to the operations 
of the bank, because it is this ownership that ensures the sustainability of these entities as 
members are quick to safeguard the functioning and oversight of these banks  
 
What one must keep in mind is the fact that the definition posed by academics, policy papers 
and oversight bodies, most definitely does not translate into the picture of the Village Bank 
one sees at community level. For this reason, it must be noted that the definition posed above 
is a purely academic one and it will become increasingly clear throughout this dissertation, 
that what is practiced on a day-to-day level in quite different.  
 
f) The ‘banked’ and ‘unbanked’  
The South African banking landscape is said to be advanced and up to standard in 
comparison to the rest of the developing world.55 With legislation such as the National Credit 
																																																						
52 R Cull et al ‘Microfinance Meets the Market’ available at 
https://siteresourcesqa.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/MicrofinanceMeetstheMarketwps4630.pdf, accessed 
on 25 May 2017.  
25 May 2017.  
53 D Porteus & E Hazelhurst Banking on Change (2004) 96. 
54 Ibid.	
55‘Underbanked versus Banked: an insight into the South African Retail Banking sector and reasons for high 
percentage of the unbanked population’ available at 
http://traderoot.weebly.com/uploads/3/1/3/8/31384375/thought_leadership__unbanked_vs__underbanked_v1.0.
pdf, accessed on 20 May 2017.  
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Act56 protecting consumers, as well as wide ranging banking services provided not only by 
the ‘Big 4’ banks57 but also numerous up and coming financial institutions, it seems that the 
banking sector is trying to adapt to the highly tumultuous South African economic climate.  
 
Despite this purported progressive outlook on banking in South Africa, an estimated 23.5 per 
cent of the population tend to remain out of reach of formal banks; or rather the banks remain 
out of their reach.58 This is relevant because a projected R12 billion circulates outside of the 
formal banking realm due to its inadequacies and failure to provide more inclusive 
alternatives.59 People who move within these circles are referred to as the ‘unbanked’ 
whereby they do not utilise the services that are provided for by the formal banking sector.  
 
According to Porteous and Hazelhurst,60 those who form a part of the ‘banked’ population 
include anyone with any sort of transaction account, which can range from a sophisticated 
interest bearing loan account to a simple deposits account.61 This means you are considered 
‘banked’ even if you have an account that has been inoperative for years. According to 
research conducted by FinMark Trust, 67 per cent of the South African population (16 years 
and older) are considered ‘banked’.62  
 
It must however be noted that the majority of those dubbed as ‘banked’, generally withdraw 
all the money in their accounts as soon as it has been deposited. On a similar note, those who 
have a South Africa Social Security Agency (SASSA) card63 have been included in the 
statistics as those who are ‘banked’ even though this is just a method via which they may 
receive their social grants. Arguably one may question to what extent they are engaging in 
formal banking practices and are instead using a bank account as a mere conduit to obtain 
their salaries and social grants.  
 
																																																						
56 34 of 2005. 
57 ABSA, First National Bank, Standard Bank. 
58 Oxford Business Group ‘South African banks making efforts to reach and integrate the unbanked population’ 
available at 
https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/final-20-reaching-unbanked-population-complex-task, accessed 
on 22 May 2017.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Porteus & Hazelhurst (2004) op cit note 53. 
61 Ibid at 21. 
62 FinMark Trust (2016) http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/finscope-south-africa-2016-
leave-behind.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2017.  
63 SASSA is the institution through which social grants in South Africa are administered.		
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In order to provide a more nuanced approach, one may look at a third category of persons: 
the ‘underbanked’ a term, that has been coined by American academics.64 This means that the 
individual has a bank account however the amount of funds that pass through this account 
remains nominal and there is limited interaction with other financial services due to 
inadequate security, high interest rates and limited access.65  
 
It is for this reason that the ‘underbanked’ often straddle the formal and informal financial 
sectors, making use of formal institutions only when utterly necessary.66 It is submitted that 
although categorised as ‘banked’ those persons using their SASSA cards or withdrawing all 
funds as soon as deposited, may be better categorised as ‘underbanked’ in order to reflect 
their relationship with formal banking more accurately.  
 
g) Social Capital  
Unlike financial capital, social capital is defined as the connections and social networks 
among individuals that gives rise to reciprocity and trustworthiness between members of a 
group or community.67 This cannot be described as a single entity but rather a myriad of 
interpersonal connections that enable community members to trust each other and in turn 
predict the behaviour of their counterparts.68 
 
The World Bank has gone on to define social capital as ‘informal social networks and formal 
organisations used by individuals and households to produce goods and services for their own 
consumption, exchange or sale’.69 This presupposes a network of informal social 
relationships, that involve mutual co-operation in an attempt to fill the gaps left by 
governments in fulfilling public services. 70 
 
In informal economies, social capital is the engine that drives economic and social well-being 
because it gives individuals the opportunity to engage in their own development without 
																																																						
64 J Buckland & W Simpson ‘Analysis of credit constraint and financial exclusion with Canadian microdata’ 
(2008) 7 Presentation to Canadian Economics Association, Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid. 
67 RD Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community (2000) 19.  
68 Jones & Dallimore (2009) op cit note 7. 
69 R, Rose ‘Measures of social capital in African surveys’ available at http://www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk, 
accessed on 27 May 2017.  
70 K Meagher ‘Social Capital or Analytical liability? Social Networks and African Informal Economies’ (2005) 
5 Global Networks 3 at 220.   
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having to rely on formal structures.71 It is nestled comfortably in the functioning of ordinary 
everyday life and for this reason has been very effective in realising developmental ends.72 
 
Social networks; composed of a group of individuals, whose increased economic interaction 
and social relationships reduce the risks associated with dealing with strangers.73 A social 
network necessarily implies solidarity and so by interacting with one member, one is in turn 
interacting with the entire group.74 By having a social network, information circulates quickly 
and reputations of the group’s members are built swiftly, allowing one to differentiate the 
honest from the dishonest. 75 
 
A result of social capital is social sanctions which are invoked by members of the group or 
community when an individual transgresses the informal arrangement which are often a 
result of these networks.76 These sanctions are used as a cooperation mechanism, t prevent 
defection and, in turn, are a risk mitigating mechanism as the threats of sanctions often inhibit 
members from breaking their arrangements. 77 
 
V. SCOPE OF DISSERTATION  
This dissertation will examine the juncture between the formal and informal sectors in the 
realm of banking, with focus on the phenomenon of Village Banks. To achieve this, I will 
examine the government attempts at regulation and the informal sector practice, juxtaposing 
them to determine which is more effective in providing financial services to the poor. 
 
Although these Banks remain inherently informal, government has made numerous attempts 
to regulate them and bring these institutions into the formal financial sphere. This paper aims 
to consider whether there is need for regulation and survey the government’s attempts to do 
so, considering both successes and failures.  
																																																						
71 EB Geleta ‘Social Capital as Collateral: Banking on the Poor’ (2014) 73 American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology 1 at 109.  
72 Ibid.  
73 M Ferray ‘Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending Activities’ (2003) 31 Journal of 
Socioeconomics 6 at 679. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid.  
76 J Baland, R Somanathan & Z Wahhaj ‘Social sanctions and repayment incentives in group lending’, working 
paper No 192 from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics (2011). 
77 Ibid.  
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Despite attempts at regulation, there is recognition of the need for the informal sector. For 
this reason, this paper aims to outline the informal sector practice and how they are able to 
regulate themselves without government intervention.  
 
Finally, a determination will be made as to whether there is a need for further regulation, 
taking into consideration the continual interface between the formal and informal sectors. 
Concluding whether the current disposition of these institutions as they operate on the ground 



























CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF VILLAGE BANKS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
As microfinance in South Africa becomes more prevalent, there are increasing attempts by 
the government to intervene in and regulate this sector. These attempts do however, often fall 
on deaf ears as we see that most of them have been unsuccessful. Village Banks, with a 
diverse history of oversight mechanisms and attempted regulation, remain for the most part 
regulated in an indiscriminate manner.  
 
This Chapter will outline the history of the regulation and oversight of Village Banks in 
South Africa. By examining the history of these entities, it is hoped that one will take heed of 
the failures that followed and aim to remedy them in future proposals. Looking at earlier 
attempts at regulation is imperative to the fate of the formalisation of Village Banks.  
 
In giving a background and build up to the current regulation, the trends that exist that exist 
in the regulation of not only Village Banks but also most other informal entities will be 
identified. An overview of the regulation mechanisms that currently exist will be provided, 
giving an opinion on the achievements and failures in the attempted formalisation of these 
banks.   
 
II. BACKGROUND  
In the late 90’s Village Banks gained traction in international jurisdictions. The Grameen 
Bank in India can be pinpointed as the first of its kind, its history tracing to Bangladeshi 
independence in 1970.78 Here, the innovation of group lending was introduced to alleviate all 
the issues associated with modern banking by taking advantage of community relationships 
and kinship.79  
 
From here, we have seen the infiltration of these institutions across the world in differing 
forms such as Bolivia’s BancoSol or the Village Bank Model affiliated with Foundation for 
International Community Assistance (FINCA),80 Pro Mujer81 and Freedom from Hunger.82 
																																																						
78Grameen Research Inc op cit note 46 at 11. 
79 Ibid at 12. 
80 this is a network that operates globally in order to provide secure and sustainable microfinance in order to 
facilitate job creation, improve standards of living and accumulation of assets. Finca.org 
	 20	
Although all different in their approach to the formulation and regulation of Village Banks, 
they all seem to share a common goal, the alleviation of poverty and bringing about 
development by garnering access to banking facilitates via group lending and responsibility.83 
 
According to the above models, Village Banks are to be made up of between 30 and 50 
members who are joint owners of the banks and responsible for its day-to-day governance.84 
These banks provide financial services in the form of savings and credit facilities - credit 
being dependent on the amount that members could save.85 Funds were also provided by 
various Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), which allowed the bank’s credit facilities to 
increase without having members mobilising more funds. 86 
 
The Village Bank formulation in South Africa has undergone a myriad of changes since its 
inception as initiated by IFAD, the initial funder of the first Village Banks in South Africa.87 
Under this pilot project, three Village Banks were formed in the North-West Province.88 
After the preliminary set-up period and implementation of these three projects, the endeavour 
was handed over to the National Department of Agriculture (NDA) who was to play an 
oversight, advisory role.89 
 
At this point, there was debate as to the legal construction of a Village Bank, as overseen by 
the NDA. Some commentators argued that these banks should register as companies in terms 
of the old Companies Act,90 while others made the argument for the more favoured Co-
																																																																																																																																																																								
81 A Bolivian non-profit organization that provides women with microfinance and other services to alleviate 
poverty. The communal banking methodology aims to use group lending to curb the risks associated with 
modern banking while providing integrated services to the women of Latin American. J Luce ‘Pro Mujer: 
Journey Towards Women’s Empowerment in Latin America’ available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/pro-mujer-journey-towards_b_292239.html, accessed on 10 
June 2017.  
82 This organization aims to offer integrated health and education services via the introduction of micro-finance. 
Available at https://www.freedomfromhunger.org, accessed on 10 June 2017.  
83 Grameen Research Inc op cit note 46. 
84 M Nigrini Analysis of Financial Service Cooperatives (unpublished Master of Commerce Thesis, 
Stellenbosch University, 2005) at 87. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid at 88.	
87 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 11. 
88 Ibid at 12. 
89 IFAD (1997). Financial Services Associations Assessment Mission. Rome, International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 
90 No. 61 of 1973. 
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operative structure.91 It was up to these two camps to make submissions to the Registrar of 
Banks for a decision to be made. 
 
One such submission was made to the Registrar by EFK Tucker Inc (1996), stating that these 
entities would be better suited registered in terms of the Co-operatives Act.92 The reasons for 
this, it was submitted, was lower registration costs, greater flexibility, a simpler management 
framework and a less complicated capital structure was in essence better suited for Village 
banks, which for the most part are situated in rural areas.93 
 
This submission was accepted and Village Banks were subsequently registered as FSCs with 
the Registrar of Co-operatives, falling under the centralised support structure of the Financial 
Services Association (FSA), established in terms of the Co-operatives Act.94 Because FSC’s 
provide financial services, including the taking of deposits, they were further to be registered 
under the Banks Act.95 This Act provides that the FSC must be registered either as a bank 
under the Banks Act96 or a mutual bank under the Mutual Banks Act.97  
 
The registration fees applicable, which are R250 million for a bank and R50 million for a 
mutual bank, were clearly beyond the capabilities of FSC’s and thus it was clear that they 
would need to be exempt from this requirement.98 The FSA was mandated to make 
submissions to the Minister as to why FSC’s should be exempt from the Banks Act.99 Upon 
the success of these submissions, an exemption was issued which made provision for these 
institutions to take deposits from their members so long as an oversight body was created.100  
 
Furthermore, this exemption mandated that Village Banks be linked to a formal banking 
institution. 101 This was to be done so that Village Banks could provide greater financial 
services to their members via the link bank as well as receive training and support from these 
																																																						
91 Nigrini (2001) op cit note 50 at 4. 
92 Op cit note 12. 
93 Nigrini (2005) op cit note 84 at 91. 
94 Op cit note 12. 
95 Op cit note 9. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Op cit note 11. 
98 Nigrini (2001) op cit note 50 at 6. 
99 Op cit note 9. 
100 Op cit note 9.  
101 Nigrini (2001) op cit note 50 at 6.    
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formal institutions.102 Under this exemption FSCs could accept deposits to a maximum of 
R10 million, advance loans and provide their members with a share in profits.103  
 
Over and above this, the exemption required that the FSC be a member of a self-regulatory 
body to be approved by the Registrar of Banks or by the Registrar of Co-operatives.104 The 
result of this was the formal acknowledgement that the FSA was the self-regulating body for 
all Village Banks and all other FSC’s.105 The FSA was further mandated to act with the 
Registrar of Banks to institute a development plan to provide representation for these 
institutions on a macro-level.106  
 
After being granted funding to the tune of R7 million from the Department of Social Welfare, 
the FSA was directed to establish 70 Village Banks over a period of 30 months.107In doing 
this, the FSA was to provide pre-launch support and finance, register new FSCs, give 
technical assistance; as well as develop and market these entities.108 Training, consolidation 
of financial statements, auditing and arbitration of disputes were also tasks of this umbrella 
organisation.109 
 
This was however short-lived because once the funding ran dry, the FSA ceased to exist.110 
The FSA’s demise could be attributed to the various restructuring initiatives of the entity over 
its tenure; breakdowns in communication; lack of expertise; reporting failures; evidence of 
mismanagement of funds, and poor service provision. 111 This was further exacerbated by the 
fact that over the period of 30 months, the FSA was only able to establish 29 Village Banks 
nationwide, confidence in the organisation dwindled.112 
 
Following the collapse of FSA, FinaSol, a registered non-profit organisation, was instructed 
by the Registrar of Banks to integrate Village Banks into its operations.113 FinaSol was 
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funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and was 
registered in terms of s21 of the Companies Act of 1975, based on a franchising business 
model.114 FinaSol (the franchisor) was to provide start-up support to these institutions, while 
the Village Bank (the franchisee), who was not expected to purchase the franchise, had to 
register as a FSC in terms of the Co-operatives act.115 
 
After the approval of a business plan by FinaSol, the Village Banks was given start up 
assistance in the form of a loan to the tune of R40 000 and a grant of R8 000 for the purchase 
of a safe.116 The Bank was responsible for the setting up of the institution and its day-to-day 
running, procuring FinaSol’s assistance for only training and funding when need be.117 Once 
the system was operating, FinaSol and the Village Bank would share any income received 
from transaction charges. 118 
 
The franchise agreement required the Bank to acquire suitable premises and regulated the 
relationship between the Village Bank and a formal bank, proving an important component of 
the provision of financial services to the members.119 Recognised by the Registrar of Banks, 
FinaSol was said to conduct the same basic services that were provided for by FSA.120 By 
providing training, financial services, audit and risk management assistance, it was hoped that 
these banks would have greater transparency and management.121 
 
Being afforded a multitude of funding by international donors, FinaSol’s initial success was 
vast, even garnering support from big banks such as First National Bank (FNB).122 This 
support however diminished as operations became increasingly expensive and funding 
scarcer, which meant that in 2001 FinaSol ceased to operate.123 This instigated a process 
																																																						
114 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 15. 
115 Porteus & Hazelhurst (2004) op cit note 53 at 197. 









where infeasible FSC’s and FinaSol Village Banks were closed down and R5.3 million was 
made available to refund savings of those members who had lost funds.124  
 
Despite the failure of these umbrella institutions, it must be noted that many Village Banks 
established under both FSA and FinaSol continue to operate in their individual capacities, at 
community level, without any external assistance.125 Many of these institutions tend to 
operate outside of the hand of the law and are able to regulate themselves with varying 
degrees of success.  
 
 An example of such self-regulation is one of the first Village Banks, Motswedi, which 
continues to operate with 1552 members and a portfolio of R1.8 million. 126 This is an 
indication that regardless of whether there is regulation or an oversight body, these banks still 
have the propensity to operate at an effective level.  
 
III. CURRENT REGULATION 
a) Introduction  
Currently, there are roughly 62 Village Banks that are registered with the Registrar of Co-
operatives in terms of the Co-operatives Act127 or Co-operative Banks Act.128 Out of these 
Village Banks, 32 were a result of the FSA and 30 were a result of FinaSol while several 
Village Banks remain unregistered and operate within local community structures.129 It is 
estimated that in terms of those registered banks, there are between 60 000 and 80 000 
members encompassing a total portfolio of R40 million.130  
 
The current regulation and oversight of Village Banks is haphazard and inconsistent, being 
far from satisfactory. This can be attributed to the numerous failed oversight bodies and 
attempts by government to bring Village Banks into their sphere of influence. As a result of 
this, there are numerous institutes, although none solely dedicated to Village Banks, that 
purport to oversee these entities. These bodies will be outlined in the proceeding section.  
																																																						
124 FinMark Trust ‘Understanding Financial Co-operatives : South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland’ (2014) 
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b) The Registrar of co-operatives  
Prior to the Co-operative Banks Act, 131 all co-operatives were regulated by the Co-operatives 
Act.132 With the promulgation of the Co-operative Banks Act,133 all Co-operatives registered 
under the previous Act with a membership of over 200 people and a deposit holding of over 
R1 million were to fall under the Co-operative Banks Act.134 The purpose of this legislation 
was to provide a framework for registration and regulation of CFIs which are said to include 
(although this is not made clear by the legislation) FSCs, village banks, credit unions, saving 
and credit co-operatives.135  
 
This legislation formalises and places importance on the role of the Registrar of Co-
operatives as well as the significance of registering the entity as a CFI. Under the Co-
operatives Amendment Act,136 co-operatives are divided into three categories: primary, 
secondary and tertiary.137 The divisions mean that co-operatives are regulated differently 
depending on the number of members, services provided for and sector in which it 
operates.138 The role of the Registrar also differs accordingly.  
 
Furthermore, the amendment essentially introduces a fourth level of co-operative by creating 
an apex body, the South African Apex Co-operative (SANACO) which has been given R3.5 
million to professionalise its operations.139 There is also provision for the creation of three 
super-structures that aim to garner support for the co-operative institution: the Co-operatives 
Development Agency (CDA) has been created to provide both financial and non-financial 
assistance to all co-operatives; a Co-operatives Tribunal for the settlement of disputes; and a 
Co-operatives Advisory Council responsible for research, development and an advisor to the 
Minister on the sector.140 
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Although CFI’s remain under the auspices of the Co-operatives Act and are registered with 
the Registrar of Co-operatives, it must be noted that currently none of these institutions are 
receiving any support services and are operating according to their community’s social and 
economic structures.141 It is submitted that the Registrar does not have the necessary 
expertise, capacity, finances or human resources to act as an oversight mechanism for Village 
Banks.142 
 
c) National Department of Agriculture (NDA) 
The NDA has again stepped up to the plate and is presently trying to support the activities of 
Village Banks through their recognition of CFI’s in the agricultural industry. The NDA set up 
a strategy to upheave the regulation, create growth and address issues associated with these 
entities as well as assess the viability of Village Banks.143 
 
 In attempts to garner support the NDA created a Co-operative Development Fund, setting up 
a task team consisting of members of Village Banks, the NDA and the Registrar of Co-
operatives to devise a strategy that could be developed and implemented in order to create 
structures that will support Village Banks.144  Furthermore, this team developed a business 
model devoted to integrating the cooperative system, emphasising the economic participation 
of Village Bank members as sustainable institutions that are cost effective and sufficient.145 
 
More recently the Co-operative and Enterprise development branch of the NDA has taken 
this initiative under its wing.146 The aims of this sector are development of co-operatives on a 
national scale as well as creating frameworks and strategies in relation to the co-operative 
movement.147 It is hoped that by providing guidelines as to the setting up of a co-operative 




141 Porteus & Hazelhurst (2004) op cit note 53 at 197. 
142 Dallimore (2013) op cit note 20 at 68. 
143 FinMark Trust (2003) op cit note 8 at 22. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid at 23. 
146 Department of Agriculture, forestry and fisheries ‘Co-operative and Enterprise Development’ available at 
http://www.daff.gov.za/daffweb3/Branches/Economic-Development-Trade-Marketing/Co-operatives-and-
Enterprise-Development, accessed on 18 June 2017.  
147 Ibid. 
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d) Companies and Intellectual Properties Commission (CIPC)  
The Co-operatives Act gives the responsibility of co-operative development and support to 
all national departments under the leadership of the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI).149 The DTI has also been saddled with the functions of registration and de-registration 
of co-operatives, in the hopes that it is able to provide for a more decentralised and efficient 
procedure.150  
 
The Registrar of Co-operatives offices are located within CIPC as it is hoped that this will 
streamline, co-ordinate and promote the establishment of these institutions.151 It is anticipated 
that by aligning CIPC and the Registrar of Co-operatives in providing legal supervision and 
oversight, compliance by the entities will improve.152  
 
Subsequently, the DTI has implemented a ten-year strategy referred to as the Integrated 
Strategy on the Development and Promotion of Co-operatives, which sets out a framework 
that ensures government participation and cooperation at all levels of development.153 The 
strategy envisions providing for conditions to enable co-operatives to evolve into self-
sustainable and self-regulating authorities that are supported by all stakeholders, contributing 
to economic growth and bringing about transformation in South Africa.154 
 
The main objectives of the strategy are to strengthen the sustainability of co-operatives as 
well as promoting these institutions as saving and investment opportunities, that are viable 
alternatives to formal banking institutions. Furthermore, through education, the strategy 
hopes to emphasise the advantages of co-operatives, such as economies of scale and 





149 Op cit note 12.  
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IV. FINDINGS  
It is evident from the above that there is no legislation that is dedicated solely to regulating 
Village Banks. These banks, along with many other informal financial institutions have either 
been grouped together and dealt with in terms of the Co-operatives Act,156 are registered with 
CIPC and are overseen by the NDA, or continue to operate outside the scope of any of these 
bodies.  
 
With the collapse of dedicated oversight bodies and the ineffectiveness of current ones, 
Village Banks remain self-regulated with little formal regulation or support. One must note 
that because Village Banks continue to operate, the demise of these umbrella institutions has 
not led to the decrease in Village Banks, who manage to achieve some success and growth as 
evidenced by the Motswedi Village Bank.157  
 
There is essentially a duplication of regulatory responsibility as one sees the Registrar of 
Banks, the Registrar of Co-operatives, the NDA and CIPC all having to play a role in the 
regulation, registration and oversight of these institutions.158 This creates confusion and leads 
to incomprehensive strategies, with policies overlapping and a lack of cohesiveness in a 
national approach to these institutions and their governance.159  
 
A further issue that must be addressed is the haphazard creation of oversight bodies who have 
the inability to be effective and achieve their objectives. Most of these bodies are plagued by 
mediocre management, poor communication, a lack of national cohesion and little 
government support, as evidenced by the need for international funding. It is submitted that if 
the government were to take the project of microfinance and access to financial institutions 
by the poor seriously, it would invest further time, money and resources in ensuring these 
bodies succeed. 
 
Commentators have argued that regulation of these institutions via exemptions is not the 
appropriate way to deal with their governance.160 By being granted an exemption to the 
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Banks Act,161 the purpose was that the legislation in question was not supposed to deal with 
the situation which gave rise to the exemption but, rather, what should follow, is further 
legislation that is specific enough to cover that which is the subject of the exemption.162 
 
Confusion is created by terminology, with lawmakers failing to define the institutions, for 
example, FSCs and CFIs, which they purport to regulate. With little precision, there remains 
uncertainty as to which legislation regulates which institution. By drawing inadequate 
parameters of these institutions and the laws that govern them, those who operate within 
these structures do not know or understand the law, which further exacerbates the issue of 
oversight.  
 
Lastly there seems to be a general disregard by law and policy makers for the communities 
that these institutions tend to operate in. By enforcing bureaucratic structures and using a top-
down approach, one may argue that this has led to the demise of many of the projects that 
have been undertaken to regulate and oversee Village Banks. In failing to integrate the voice 
of those impacted by the regulation, there is often little regard taken for the law and these 
institutions tend to continue per their own modus operandi. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is evident that Village Banks do not have the capacity nor the resources to represent 
themselves at a national level and thus there is still need for an overarching structure to fill 
this void. As current regulation of this sector stands, it is evident that there is no cohesive nor 
comprehensive approach to Village Banks, who have tended to be lodged together with FSCs 
and CFIs.  
 
One can thus argue that there is a lacuna in the law with regards to Village Banks and other 
micro-finance practices. This is because there in neither dedicated nor effective regulation 
and oversight mechanisms that are in place to ensure the success and wellbeing of these 
institutions. Those institutions that do exist remain ineffective either due to lack of funding or 
government initiative to get them off the ground. 
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CHAPTER THREE: OVERVIEW OF THE APPLICABLE LEGISLATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Both the Co-operatives Act and the Co-operative Banks Act were enacted to ‘level the 
playing field’ for those who previously could not participate in the South African economy. 
These structures have been identified as suitable vessels that can be used to foster 
opportunities for growth and development for rural and urban communities who require a 
hand-up in the process of economic transformation. 
 
This Chapter will delve deeper into these pieces of legislation in order to determine their 
suitability to the Village Bank structure. In outlining the law, looking at the administration, 
organisation and institutions set out in these acts, I hope to draw attention to both their 
aptness and flaws in order to gain a clearer picture as to the legal status of these institutions in 
South Africa.  
 
II. CO-OPERATIVES ACT163 
In 2007, the Co-operatives Act (later amended)164 came into operation and it was hoped that 
this piece of progressive legislation would catapult these entities into the spotlight in the 
South African financial sector. Its aim was to set out how co-operatives should be registered, 
developed and what part the government would play in this. 165  
 
a) Administration of the Act  
A co-operative, as per the Act, is defined as “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic and social needs and aspirations through a jointly 
owned and democratically controlled enterprise, organised and operated on co-operative 
principles.”166 This is a broad definition that could be used to describe a multitude of 
microfinance entities however, this may be the point as the Act is said to have been created 
with the purpose of covering an umbrella of institutions.   
 
																																																						
163 Op cit note 12. 
164 Op cit note 136. 
165 J Sarkin ‘The Reshaping of the co-operatives legal architecture as a result of the 2013 amendments to the 
2005 Co-operatives Act: Promoting democratic governance and economic sustainability or control and 
overregulation? (2015) 27 South African Mercantile Law Journal 284. 
166 Op cit note 12 at s1.	
	 31	
These entities were recognised, as per the Act, as ones that are self-reliant, self-sustaining and 
self-governing, which are to play a role in the economic growth of the South African 
economy.167 The Act168 goes as far as to incorporate the seven principles outlined by the 
International Co-operative Alliance, these being:169 
1. Voluntary and open membership 
2. Democratic member control 
3. Members’ economic participation 
4. Autonomy and independence 
5. Education, information and training 
6. Co-operation between co-operatives 
7. Concern for community 
Essentially, this Act gives a range of entities a legal identity, which is separate to that of their 
members by providing for registration, operational and oversight requirements. The Co-
operative Act is a very thorough piece of legislation that goes to great lengths to set out the 
application process,170 the drafting of the so-operatives’ constitutions,171 record keeping 
requirements,172 composition of the boards 173 and capital structures.174 
 
It provides for the application and registration of three types of co-operatives: a primary co-
operative, a secondary co-operative and a tertiary co-operative.175 A primary co-operative is 
defined as one which is formed by a minimum of five natural persons whose objective is to 
provide employment or services to its members as well as facilitate development in their 
communities.176 A secondary co-operative is formed by two or more primary co-operatives 




167 Preamble of the Co-operatives Act 14 of 2005. 
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A tertiary co-operative consists of members of secondary co-operatives whose objective is to 
advocate and engage organs of state, the private sector and stakeholders on behalf of its 
members.178 A fourth layer of co-operative is also created by the Act in the form of the 
National Apex Co-operative which is said to unite all co-operatives across South Africa so as 
to act on behalf of the co-operative movement at national and international level. 179 
 
It is hoped that in creating a super-structure, there will be co-ordination at all levels of 
government, an aspiration that runs as a gold thread throughout the Act.180 By fostering a 
spirit of co-operation, organisation and unification, it is anticipated that there will be greater 
coherence in policies surrounding support, training, monitoring and planning.181  
 
In the spirit of co-operation and coherence, the Act has established an Inter-Provincial 
Coordination Committee, which is a welcome step in the project of harmonisation.182 As it 
stands every province is operating according to its own interpretation of the legislation, there 
is no national database of the entities that exist and in general there is very little leadership.183 
 
b) Oversight bodies 
Chapter 11 and 12 set out the support structures for co-operatives in South Africa. In terms of 
Chapter 11, the Minister of Finance is to appoint a Registrar of Co-operatives who is given 
broad powers to oversee the registration and running process of co-operatives as set out in the 
Act.184 The Registrar has exclusive powers to investigate co-operatives which she or he 
suspects have contravened the Act or the Co-operatives Principles and give recommendations 
to the Minister in this regard.185  
 
Chapter 12A is a welcome improvement brought about by the 2013 amendment which 
establishes the CDA.186 This agency is answerable to the Minister of Finance, who is 
mandated to direct its work and ensure accountability of the body’s actions.187 The Act 
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mandates the Agency to enter into agreements and memorandums of understandings, with the 
councils responsible for economic development in provinces and municipalities, again an 
attempt to streamline co-operative operations.188  
 
This body is responsible for providing custom-made support and guidance services to co-
operatives across the country.189 It is hoped, that unlike previous structures, it will be an 
entity that is closer to co-operatives geographically because satellite branches will be 
established where it is deemed necessary.190 The Agency is mandated to assist with training, 
evaluation, provide support of all kinds, education and implement development strategies.191 
 
This is a commendable project in theory, with a number of aspirational goals, however there 
is no evidence that such an agency exists, with the Department of Trade and Industry making 
no mention of it. 192  One hopes that in the future it will come to fruition with the requisite 
resources, trained staff and finances to provide greater support for co-operatives. 
 
Chapter 12 creates a Co-operatives Advisory Board (now Council) that is composed of 10 
members who are said to appropriately represent the interests of co-operatives in South 
Africa, incorporating trade unions, academics and support organisations.193 Their purpose is 
to advise the Minister of Finance about policy development, the application of the Act, the 
creation and publication of any necessary regulations, provide guidelines about audits as well 
as regarding any support programmes aimed at co-operatives.194 
 
The problem with this section is that no provision is made for input from already existing co-
operatives, which brings into question the democratic process.195 The Minister is not obliged 
to consult with co-operatives or their members when appointing such individuals.196 
Furthermore, there seems to be no requirement that a percentage of the members of the Co-
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operatives Advisory Board be members of actual co-operatives, it is submitted that this is a 
failure on the legislature’s behalf.197 
 
It is clear that a board that is not composed of at least a percentage of co-operative members 
would be of little use to the Minister when called on to provide advice on the development 
and support of these entities. It is certain that those on the ground - people who are part of the 
co-operative movement - would be best equipped to provide information as to what is and 
what is not working in terms of policy and legislation.  
 
c) FSC’s 
Schedule 1 is where the provisions pertaining to specialised Co-operatives can be found. 
These specialised Co-operatives include: worker’s co-operatives, housing co-operatives, 
FSC’s and agricultural co-operatives.198 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will look more 
closely at part 3 of Schedule 1, which relates to FSCs.  
 
A FSC is defined as one whose main objective is to provide financial services to its members 
and this definition includes credit unions, co-operative banks, savings and credit co-
operatives along with any other financial services.199 This part of the schedule also sets out 
added requirements for such a co-operative’s constitution, for instance it must state the exact 
nature of the services the FSCs will provide.200 
 
It further provides that the constitution of an FSC may include provisions on the receiving of 
deposits from members, loaning of money to members, the investing of members’ money, the 
provision of insurance to members as well as the rendering of any other banking and financial 
services.201 Provisions relating to long and short-term insurance cover for members, medical 
insurance and the provision of funeral cover to members may also be contained in the 
constitution if provided by the co-operative.202 
 
The provision of any of the above services is, of course, subject to the legislation that pertains 
to it, for example, the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 would apply to co-operatives 
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whose purpose is to provide long-term insurance to its members. 203 As per this Part, the 
Registrar is entitled to create a regulatory body, that oversees the functioning of FSCs and 
ensures compliance with the requisite Acts.204  
 
It is evident that a FSC could take myriad forms and perform numerous functions. The 
definition is broad enough that one would be able to incorporate Village Banks into this part 
of Schedule 1 and both the Co-operatives Act and the relevant Schedule may apply. 
Furthermore, if one looks at the definition of co-operative in s1 of the Co-operatives Act, this 
too is broad enough to incorporate Village Banks and their provision of financial services.  
 
d) Analysis of the Co-operatives Act 
The Act is however, not free of faults. Although the registration rate is impressive, it seems 
that many of these co-operatives cease to operate within their first year, an example of which 
is shown by the is decline of 52 per cent in the 2008/2009 financial year.205 Among those 
who remain registered, many co-operatives are inactive and it has been found that there is a 
12 per cent survival rate of these entities.206 This low rate is attributed to a number of factors, 
both internal and external, that hinder the co-operative process. 
 
Issues inherent in the Act, include very onerous auditing standards. The Act states that an 
audit must be conducted annually to ensure that all accounting records are kept as per the 
requirements set out in the co-operatives constitution and by the law.207 The auditor’s report 
must be approved at the annual general meeting of the co-operative and submitted to the 
Registrar within 15 days of it being finalised.208 
 
Arguably this is a very burdensome requirement, considering the little amount of 
governmental support that co-operatives are given. Co-operatives are expected to navigate 
this landscape with very little guidance as to how this process plays out to ensure compliance 
with the Act. This could however be resolved by increased training and education for those 
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who are running the co-operatives, to foster development rather than hinder it by imposing 
sanctions for non-compliance. 
 
A saving grace is that the law provides that a primary co-operative is to be divided into three 
categories so as to afford differentiation in compliance regarding auditing.209 The first of 
these, category A co-operatives, are only expected to comply with the bare minimum, still 
needing to produce a report, but the report is not required to be audited.210 The second 
category, B, is expected to produce an independently reviewed financial report, while 
category C, along with secondary and tertiary co-operatives, need to provide fully audited 
financial statements to the Registrar. 211 
 
This is a step in the right direction as it affords a degree of flexibility in regulation and 
oversight, rather than a one size fits all approach.  This does make the co-operative more in 
reach to those who cannot access these services elsewhere and takes cognisance of the fact 
that there will be entities of different sizes performing different functions.  
 
The division of primary co-operatives into sub-categories only provides some relief to co-
operatives that are starting out, as s46 contains another hurdle that needs to be overcome in 
order to adhere to the Act. This section prescribes that the co-operative must hold 5 per cent 
of its surplus in a fund as a reserve, which is indivisible amongst its members.212 Arguably 
this is a deterrent to the development of the co-operative movement, as it requires members 
not only to raise the start-up capital but also raise additional amounts, which may not be 
possible. 
 
A further criticism leveraged against the Act is its arduous record-keeping requirements.  The 
co-operative is required to keep records of every meeting held; lists of all members’ details 
and deposits; keep a register of its directors along with all their interests and undertakings, as 
well as all accounting records for a period of five years.213 Failure to adhere to any of these 
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requirements is an offense and the co-operative will be liable for punishment of a fine up to 
R1 million and its directors may both be fined and imprisoned.214 
 
Arguably, these are quite harsh penalties for non-compliance considering the fact that the 
ethos of the Act is growth, development and to foster inclusion in the South African 
economy. In terms of this section and many others, there is little leniency towards co-
operatives who are in their infancy stage, nor to those who cannot afford to adhere strictly to 
these sections because they are smaller in size and function.  
 
Ultimately the low survival rate of co-operatives can be attributed to the poor support 
systems that are currently in place and the amount of red tape that one must overcome in 
order to register a co-operative.215 The government and private sector need to create an 
environment where co-operatives are provided with technical and financial resources to 
prosper.216 Co-operatives need the most support in administration, auditing, management and 
tax - areas that require a certain skill set.  
 
At present, support is uncoordinated and haphazard which brings the sustainability of these 
entities into question.217 As stated already, education and training are integral to the success 
of co-operatives, as, generally, members are not well-versed in how to run such a body. There 
is a need for members and those governing these institutions to have great understanding of 
the Act as non-compliance can have fatal consequences.  
 
It is clear that this legislation has not been prioritised enough at government level, as co-
operatives do not receive the requisite support at national level. Some of the oversight bodies 
set out in the Act have yet to be created, while those that do exist are poorly managed and 
financed, having little impact on the running of co-operatives. 218 
 
In terms of its applicability to the Village Banks, which may fall under the category of a FSC, 
one needs to reflect on the fact that, as it stands, the support structures provided for in the Act 
remain, for the most part, ineffective. This means that even if one accepts that a Village Bank 
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is a FSC, the Co-operatives Act has little impact on the oversight, regulation and running of 
these banks. 
 
 III. CO-OPERATIVE BANKS ACT219 
The first co-operative bank in South Africa was registered in 2011. The South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) is responsible for the supervision of all registered co-operative banks, 
whilst the Co-operative Bank Development Agency (CBDA) is responsible for the 
supervision of CFIs, the development of and training needs of the sector.220 
 
The Co-operative Banks Act, 2007 seeks to redress this divide between the so-called 'banked' 
and 'un-banked' by providing a sound legislative framework within which co-operative banks 
can provide financial services.221 By enacting this legislation it was hoped that those entities 
that tended to operate under the Banks Act exemption, would fall under the Co-operative 
Banks Act.  
 
a) Administration of the Act  
 Section 1 of the Act defines a co-operative bank as a co-operative222 that is registered as per 
the stipulations of the Co-operative Banks Act, whose members are (a) of similar occupation 
or profession or who are employed by a common employer or who are employed within the 
same business district; or, (b) have common membership in an association or organisation, 
including a business, religious, social, co-operative, labour or educational group; or (c) reside 
within the same defined community or geographical area.223  
 
The Act applies not only in the scenarios above but it also applies automatically to those Co-
operatives that are registered in terms of the Co-operatives Act, that take deposits, have more 
than 200 members and hold deposits of more that R1 million.224 Although they automatically 
become co-operative banks, these entities need to comply with the provisions of s3 (2), which 
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compels the co-operative to apply to register within 1 year of the commencement of the 
Act.225 
 
Chapter IX provides for the creation of the CBDA which is responsible for providing support, 
promoting and developing co-operative banking.226 This agency is mandated to appoint, 
register, regulation and accredit a representative body that is to facilitate training and 
awareness. 227 The CBDA is to monitor trends and patterns to better advise legislators about 
co-operative banks and their operations.  
 
The Act goes to great lengths to pronounce the functions, composition, operational 
requirements and authority of the agency; however, very little information is given as to how 
this will all be achieved. The Minister is given extensive powers with regard to the CBDA, 
having the power to appoint the board of the CBDA, who must be selected based on their 
knowledge and experience. 228 Furthermore, the Minister is given executive power to monitor 
the agency and ensure compliance.229 
 
The Act provides for the registration of four categories of co-operative banks, differing in 
size and function.230 The first is the primary savings co-operative bank, which may only 
solicit and accept deposits; invest such deposits; open accounts for its members, and make 
withdrawals.231 This bank may also open savings or cheque accounts in its own name, to 
provide trust and custody services to members.232 
 
The second type of co-operative bank is the primary savings and loans co-operative bank, 
which provides the same services as the above bank but also has the power to grant secured 
and unsecured loans up to an aggregate value.233 These banks may also be endorsed, by the 
Minister of Finance when he deems fit, to perform other financial services that are not 
currently listed.234 
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A secondary co-operative bank, the third type, can provide all the services listed in ss14 (1) 
and (2) as well as trade in financial instruments on behalf of its members.235 The Act further 
mandates such banks to open an account with a bank registered under the Banks Act236 for 
the facilitation of foreign currency transactions.237 Again, the Minister of Finance is given 
discretionary power to prescribe additional functions to these banks.238  
 
The final bank, a tertiary co-operative bank, which can again provide all the functions listed 
above, may also conduct services and invest money deposited with it in any investments, that 
are prescribed by the Minister of Finance.239 It is clear that although the powers of each bank 
are listed in the Act, the Minister has inherent power to prescribe further functions to each 
category of banks, as she or he deems fit.  
 
Aside from these specific functions, attributed to each bank, the Act also sets out a number of 
general functions, that are to be performed by every registered co-operative bank.240 
According to this section, co-operative banks may receive grants and donations,241 be a 
member of a representative body or support organisation, and enter into agreements with 
such,242 establish a dispute resolution scheme with other co-operative banks of the same 
type243 and these banks may act as agents for their members or in the interest of their 
members as an intermediary of a banking or other institution as listed.244 
 
S15 (b) refers specifically to secondary and tertiary co-operative banks and in relation to 
these entities, states that they may apply for registration as a representative body as per s31 or 
accreditation as a support organisation as per s36.245 These sections, s31 and s36, spell out 
the procedures for registration but do little to inform these entities of what is required of them 
in order to fulfil such duties. These sections state that the body has the requisite experience, 
knowledge and qualifications- which is vague statement that gives little guidance as to what 
these requirements entail.  
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Chapter II of the Act sets out laborious registration requirements that must be met before a 
co-operative bank will be registered.246 One such requirement is, in the opinion of this 
dissertation, particularly onerous. Every person who is to be a director, managing director or 
executive officer of the bank must have the ‘necessary knowledge, experience and 
qualifications’.247 Again, this is extremely ambiguous, with no yardstick to ensure 
compliance 
 
b) Analysis of Co-operative Banks Act 
This Act provides for the idyllic situation. In terms of the credentials required for those in 
charge, it is unlikely that every person in a management position will be able to meet this 
standard. Again, there is a double standard in that these banks are supposed to be member run 
and owned for communities that have limited access to financial services, but at the same 
time, those in charge must have experience in co-operative banks.  
 
The prudential and reporting standards required by the Act also necessitate a degree of 
knowledge and skill, one that far surpasses the lay-person.248 Failure to comply with such 
standards will lead to the co-operative bank being wound up in terms of the Act.249 A further 
requirement is that the co-operative bank must pay an insurance fund, which is to be overseen 
by the CBDA, who is mandated to oversee and account for all monies.250 
The advantages of co-operative banks are that they can lend money at a much lower interest 
rate, compared to commercial banks. 251 These banks are able to set their own rules via the 
creation of constitutions and bring about conditions for economic development by creating 
access to savings and credit.252 Because these banks are member owned, the money made is 
sown back into the communities within which they operate.253 
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It is important to note, that after more than 10 years of this legislation being enacted, there 
exist only three registered co-operative banks.254 This speaks to the success and viability of 
these banks in South Africa, as it is evident that these laws have not been well received. The 
amount of capital and skill required to set up these banks is a hindrance from the outset which 
creates a cyclical effect – these banks are supposed to be set up for those who cannot afford 
commercial banking, however it is often too expensive to set up.  
Ideally the government should be roped in to fund this process to level the playing field with 
the major commercial banks in South Africa.  Even the Competition Commission has 
weighed in on the issue of monopoly of the banking sector, stating that it is up to government 
to intervene, by assisting with the formation and subsistence of these banks as well as 
compelling commercial banks to create a sector that is inclusionary. 255 
This dissertation submits that this piece of legislation would not be suitable to govern a 
Village Bank in its infancy stages because of the capitalisation requirements. A well-
established bank may be able to raise the requisite amount with the correct number of 
members, but for the most part this would be out of reach for the majority of Village Banks.  
IV CONCLUSION  
There are currently about 60 FSC’s with a total membership of 36 000 operating with assets 
totalling R137 million and savings to the tune of R125 million.256 To date 18 FSC’s have 
applied to be registered as co-operative banks but to no avail.257 Although the Act provides 
for the creation of various structures to support and regulate these banks, to date none of 
these have been implemented and support for co-operatives remains minimal in this regard.  
Both of these pieces of legislation are aspirational in nature, a goal to pursue and an ideal to 
achieve. They essentially outline the ideal position that one would hope to achieve should 
there be sufficient resources, support and oversight. This is however not the case and the 
reality is, that both sectors are under-financed which in turn means that the support structures 
designed by the Acts do not exist.  
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There is more that needs to be done for co-operatives and co-operative banks to prosper so as 
to further the project of economic development in South Africa. This can only be done if 
there is buy-in from all sectors of business at both a public and private level. Incentives 
should be given to motivate businesses to trade and interact with these entities.  
Although the Village Bank model could be adapted to a FSC, the requirements set out in the 
Act would place undue burden on these entities. The reporting, surplus and management 
requirements often far surpass the means that are available to Village Banks, which are 
generally located in rural areas. These banks are also far removed from the support structures 
where training and resources would be available, providing services in some of the most 
vulnerable areas of South Africa.  
As previously stated, there can be no one size approach and instead, the government needs to 
take cognisance of the communities in which these entities operate when enacting legislation. 
The legislation and bodies created as a result are far removed from the members of the 
organisations who are often laypersons that do not have the required skills to ensure 



















CHAPTER FOUR: VILLAGE BANKS, SUBSTANCE OVER FORM  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has called for an analysis of the practices that exist in society rather than merely 
attributing normative ideals to what the participation in these entities entails.258 As stated 
before, Village Banks, are in principle democratic member owned and run institutions with 
their roots in the communities that they operate in. 259 The aim is to build on local community 
based institutions, so as to facilitate participation in both membership and leadership.260 
 
Of course, this is the definition posed by academics and so it is imperative that one look to 
empirical research to gauge the veracity of these claims. Furthermore, one also needs to 
consider to what extent the regulations and legislation, as outlined in Chapter two and three, 
reach these entities and whether the policies have any real bearing on the day-to-day running 
of these institutions.  
 
In examining ethnographic accounts, one hopes to gain critical insight into the lived 
experiences of those who participate in the Village Bank process. One of the challenges in 
this regard is the availability of empirical research pertaining to Village Banks in South 
Africa and so this Chapter aims to set out an exposé of those accounts that exist.  
 
What has become clear is that there is a need for people who are unable to open bank 
accounts, for a multitude of reasons, to access financial services to keep money safe and to 
save.261 Bureaucracy and the cost of banking transactions are but some of the barriers faced 
when deciding to open an account with a financial institution, and considering the low 
literacy and education rates in South Africa, it is no surprise that this is a daunting task. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
As already stated, the lack of available data on informal banking institutions poses a serious 
problem for researchers who hope to gain insight into the practices of Village Banks. In 
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South Africa, the major research initiative, which has aimed to give insight into this sector, is 
FinScope’s annual survey that is managed by FinMark Trust.  
 
This project was first undertaken in 2003 and aims to provide an overview of the entire 
financial services sector in South Africa. One of its objectives is to deliver data and 
guidelines for pro-poor financial development.262 The purpose is to contribute to the 
provision of access to financial services for low income sectors and cater to the distinct needs 
of the poor.263 
 
The latest release of the FinScope survey, 2016, was based on a nationally representative 
sample of 4 992 adults who are 16 years or older and looked not only at the provision of 
financial services but also quality of these services.264 The main findings of the survey were 
that 89 per cent of all adults in South Africa, about 38.2 million people, have some sort of 
bank account – this being either formal or informal.265  
 
A further finding is that around 11per cent of adults, some 4.3 million people are completely 
financially excluded, meaning that, they have neither a financial service provider nor product 
in their name.266 The survey found that in terms of savings and investments, there is an 
increasing trend towards adults saving for funeral and related expenses via informal 
institutions such as stokvels.267  
 
This trend is linked to increasing transaction costs as well as the desire of individuals to 
diversify their saving strategies. A key finding of the project is that around 51 per cent of 
adults who interact with the South Africa financial services sector, are doing so by making 
use of several saving and credit mechanisms, both formal and informal. 268 
 
These findings segment the South African population into three generic categories (low, 
middle and high) and the number of adults attributed to each.269 The low income sector, the 
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largest of the three, represents 31 million people in South Africa whereas the high income 
sector amounts to only 1.2 million.270 The middle-income bracket, a growing sector in South 
Africa, accounts for 6 million people.271 
 
With most of South Africa’s population in the low-income sector, it is evident that there is an 
incredible need for financial services that are cheap, user-friendly and cater specifically to the 
needs of the poor.272 Along with addressing issues of red tape, the answer to this lack of 
integration must include strategies that are long-lived and transformative.273 
 
One must note that although, as stated above, 89 per cent of all South African adults are said 
to be ‘financially included’ this has not translated into the improvement of the lives of those 
who remain impoverished. Most of the financial products that are sold to the low income 
sector - the majority of the South African population - are not appropriate, as much of our 
population remain illiterate, indebted and are often taken advantage of by those purporting to 
offer financial services.  
 
It is hoped that by facilitating and nurturing member-based financial institutions, the financial 
sector will become more integrated. Along with the provision of support, government needs 
to spearhead the project of transformation in this sector to develop and ensure actual 
inclusion of all South Africans in reality.  
 
There is a clear need for transformation of this sector, whereby a ground-up approach should 
be utilised to ensure that those on the bottom rung are as well ‘financialised’ as those at the 
top. These institutions need to come to the realisation that the majority of South Africans are 
poor and there is a social responsibility to foster transformation for everyone.  
 
III. ETHNOGRAPHIC ACCOUNTS  
Village Banks are most prominent in KwaZulu Natal, the North West Province, 
Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, with many of them located in the most 
																																																						
270 FinMark Trust (2016) op cit note 62. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273National Treasury, Republic of South Africa ‘Budget Review: 2017’available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/review/Annexure%20F.pdf, accessed on 15 
December 2017. 	
	 47	
vulnerable areas in South Africa.274 For this reason, most ethnographic accounts have taken 
place in rural areas where there is little to no access to financial services and researchers have 
observed how people interact with money. 
 
It has been stated that people in these areas require institutions that are able to safeguard 
cash; provide for saving mechanisms; give short-term credit as well as enable people to 
transmit money.275 However due to the inadequacy of major financial institutions in South 
Africa, people have created informal institutions for themselves in order to facilitate the 
above. These have become part of what is known as the informal economy. 
 
One of the most recent and useful sources on the lived experiences of those participating in 
Village Banks is an extensive ethnographic study conducted by Dallimore.276 This research 
was undertaken in 2002 with the participation of 16 focus groups and its purpose was to 
determine whether these institutions presented a viable alternative to formal financial 
institutions.277 With the ultimate findings being that these banks have the possibility of 
facilitating economic development in these communities.278 
 
Each branch is owned and managed by its members, who were also shareholders. Each 
branch was capitalised by the purchase of one share by each member and anyone was able to 
purchase a share in the Village Bank, as there were no gate-keeping tactics used.279 In 
holding a share, which generally cost R10, each member has the right to elect the board of 
management who, in turn, is held accountable by the shareholders at an annual general 
meeting.280 
 
In theory, this is a good model, however in practice it seems not to have been so easily 
translated. What was found among the cross-section examined by Dallimore was that there 
seemed to always be a discrepancy between the number of members and shareholders.281 At 
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most banks this discrepancy was minor, however at the Motswedi bank, arguably the most 
successful Village Bank, there were 237 shareholders and 1451 account holders.282  
 
The reason most cited for this is that when members sign up, they are not given an 
opportunity to understand the legal structure of the entity and are rather instructed to buy or 
not to buy shares in the Village Bank.283 One is able to hold more than one share in the 
Village Bank. These additional shares do not however hold any voting rights nor do they 
require one to open another account. It is thus impossible, as per the Village Bank Model, to 
have more account holders than shareholders but not vice versa.284 
 
Banks ranged in size and deposits with one bank, having a membership of 3 060 holding 
R290 000 to another with a membership of 1 451 holding R1.8 million.285 Charges on 
withdrawals and deposits ranged from R0 to R6 depending on the amount involved - some 
members opting for their pensions or salaries to be deposited directly into the bank.286 Some 
banks went so far as to provide their reliable clients small loans that were to be repaid 
monthly at a small rate of interest.287 
 
The tenet of the Banks, which were the focus of Dallimore’s study, was that they were 
developed by members of the community, for the community. 288 Transparency and 
participation are key buzzwords that those interviewed used when trying to describe the 
Village Bank with which they were associated.289 Furthermore, it was evident that these 
banks had given their members a sense of ownership and pride, as they were said to be 
contributing to their communities.290 
 
Although the banks had evolved at different rates, there are some advantages and 
disadvantages that can be attributed to all of them.291 For instance, community members seem 
to show high levels of interest in these institutions and thus there has been incredible support 
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by local people in the establishment of Village Banks.292 With low operation costs and 
proximity to members, these services are competitive and serve as a great alternative to 
mainstream banking. 293 
 
Furthermore, there is community buy-in of the institutions that, as mentioned, instills a sense 
of ownership and responsibility towards these banks.294 Because members of the bank are 
also members of the community, there is a sense of trust and personal accountability between 
members and the Village Bank staff – this is because the staff live in and amongst the 
community, with strong ties of kinship which, in turn, means a degree of responsibility. 295 
 
Membership is selected on the basis of known dependability and affiliation with already 
existing members of the Village Bank.296 Many state that deals are often sealed with a 
handshake and the understanding that one is able to rely on one’s friends.297 Membership 
may be restricted by demographic or religious affiliation, both of these being used as a way to 
ensure that there are shared values amongst members.298 
 
On the downside, there is said to be a lack of training and institutional support whereby these 
banks tend to operate largely by themselves, held accountable only by their members.299 
Because of this, what often arises is that those in charge are free to make decisions liberally, 
without recourse to members – thus although in theory there is recourse, in practice it is 
difficult to enforce .300 Local power structures and authorities are often intertwined in these 
institutions, making it difficult to discern where one ends and the other begins.  
 
An example of this was seen at one of the longest standing Village Banks, the Motswedi 
Village Bank.301 It was found that there had been no election since the board was first 
established; the reason cited was that it would be counterproductive to assign new board 
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members annually.302 It was however admitted that the elders of the community have chosen 
board members and that there were indeed four tribal authorities represented on the board.303 
 
A further issue that has in the past been raised by members was the fear of interference by 
outside actors such as formal banks, NGO’s and government authorities.304 The reason for 
this angst is that members fear that outside influences may disrupt the ownership of these 
institutions as well as their ability to engage in the day-to-day running of the Village Bank.305 
Members, local authorities and the community, were observed as being highly protective of 
their control of the bank.306 
 
What is clear is that the communities want the bank to be kept local; these institutions must 
be run and owned by the communities within which they operate.307 Members and staff are 
neighbours, cousins, siblings and friends who all speak the same language and generally 
adhere to the same cultural practices.308 With a sense of mutual understanding, community 
members feel more at ease to deposit their money with the employees of the Village Bank.309 
 
As stated previously, a major finding of Dallimore was the possibility of these institutions to 
be economic catalysts for development.310 This was felt by members of Village Banks from 
across the board, who felt that part of the purpose of the bank was to bring money back to the 
community. The savings generated often lead to greater education for the local students in 
areas of money management and systems.311 Furthermore, these banks have promoted 
entrepreneurship whereby shop owners are able to access greater stock supplies and increase 
their income.312 
 
What was evident was the enthusiasm the Village Banks have generated. Communities are 
grateful for the opportunity to save their money in a safe and efficient way, having few 
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complaints regarding the overall running of the banks.313 In essence, these banks function 
effectively, with little outside support or intervention, propped up merely by the community 
and its members. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
What is evident, is that these banks do not neatly fit into the defitnions that have been posed 
by government policies, initiatives and legislation. Essentially, these banks operate at 
community level, with little to no outside intervention whether it be from government or 
other actors. Community members, community structures and local authorities are 
responsible for the running and capitalisation of the banks as well as their oversight and 
regulation.  
 
No one bank is the same and each community, as evidenced by the above, adapts the model 
to suit them and the needs of their members. The fluid and disparate nature of these entities 
means that it is hard to attribute a catch-all defintion as well as standard requirements in order 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the development and current regulation of 
Village Banks versus how these banks operate in practice.  It is hoped that the preceding 
Chapters have shed light not only on government policy, but also on the lived experiences of 
people in the Village Bank system while trying to provide some theory as to how these banks 
operate.  
 
It is submitted that the current regime is not sufficient, as the numerous attempts to regulate 
by government have had little impact on the day-to-day running of Village Banks. These 
banks tend to operate according to their own rules, with little regard for any overarching 
regulation. The following Chapter will set out some of the findings that have been made and 
pose recommendations to be considered when there is an attempt at further regulation and 
oversight of Village Banks.  
 
This Chapter aims to set out the possible routes that could be used to regulate Village Banks 
which include: the use of the Mutual Banks Act, the use of agents, Co-operatives legislation, 
a dedicated body as well as a hybrid approach.  Recommendations will then be given as to 
how such regulation should play out in reality, followed by concluding comments.  
 
II. FINDINGS  
Most Village Banks operate in the dark. They are given little to no government support and 
are unable to provide clear documentation of transactions that are undertaken.314 There is a 
clear lack of training, support, accountability and oversight of these institutions, which tends 
to lead to instances of mismanagement of funds.315  It is thus imperative that there be 
mechanisms in place to safeguard the integrity of these institutions.  
 
Regardless of dwindling government support and oversight, these banks seem to tick over on 
a day-to-day basis, providing services to the communities within which they operate.316 
Although they do not operate on a large scale, strong relationships between members mean 
																																																						




that there is a sense of ownership and trust, which is essential to the continuation and smooth 
operation of these institutions.317 
 
III. POSSIBLE REGULATION  
It is submitted that creating a single economic framework that incorporates those who are 
unable to participate in the formal banking sector, is not viable. The reason for this is that 
there must be different, less stringent standards to which informal financial institutions are 
held.318 The modus operandi is to enable and promote participation in the financial sectors of 
those previously marginalised.  
 
Hull & James state that the formal and informal operate alongside each other and are 
continually interacting with each other.319 The formal and informal sectors operate alongside 
each other supplementing one another’s deficiencies, for instance, Village Banks operate to 
cater for the insufficient services provided for the poor by formal banks.320 
 
The South African government has attempted to converge the two sectors, resulting in the so-
called ‘partial institutionalisation’ of the economy.321 Arguably, formalisation in the Village 
Banks context was done piecemeal rather than in a uniform and congruent manner.322It is 
evident that the formal structures that exist do not adequately address the distinct needs of the 
informal sector, instead, they are heavily reliant on bureaucratic power structures and red 
tape.  
 
a) Mutual Banks Act 
Coetzee and Cross323 have argued that, although not ideal, Village Banks could be subsumed 
by the Mutual Banks Act.324 As explained in Chapter two, these banks have a less stringent 
capital requirement but are subject to the same oversight as formal banks.325 The Act allows 
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for the inclusion of communities by making provision for boards of local branches as well as 
requiring share capital being mutually based,326 rather than equity based.327 
 
They argue that because this is a membership based approach that focuses on community, it 
will be more successfully applied and adapted to the informal sector.328 Furthermore, the 
Registrar may require that a mutual bank establish a relationship with a formal bank (referred 
to as a guardian bank) to provide for assistance and mitigate the downfalls associated with 
informal banking such as lack of finance and oversight.329 
 
The authors do however admit that the capital requirement of R10 million or 8 per cent of 
risk exposure effectively insures that very few of these informal organisations register as a 
mutual bank.330 The skills required to comply with the Act and reporting standards required 
are often beyond the capabilities of the Mutual Bank board members, let alone Village Bank 
members.331 With little government support at community level, it is unlikely that any such 
legislation will be strictly adhered to. 
 
What is crucial is that the benefits of formalisation should exceed the costs associated with 
adhering to legislation.332 One needs to look at the interests of all parties responsible for the 
governance and oversight of Village Banks: the members of the bank, the community, the 
Registrar and those on the board.333 It is important that no one is alienated in the process as 
this will hinder the workings of the bank, slowing down the project of oversight and 
accountability.  
 
b) Use of agents 
It must be noted that the South African banking sector is highly regulated and hugely 
complex.334 The Banks Act335 lays out strict measures that are costly to execute.336 This 
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sector is essentially controlled by the Big Four Banks who control the Payments Association 
of South Africa (PASA), which is a self-regulatory body for payments as appointed by the 
SARB.337 
 
The Banks Act does however provide wide discretion to banks, allowing them to use third 
parties to offer banking services beyond their branch via an agent.338 The Act defines an 
agent as a person who contracts with a bank to receive, on behalf of the bank, any deposits, 
money due to it or applications for loans or to make payments to clients on its behalf.339 
 
The bank agent is an entity that has been authorised by the bank to enter into legally binding 
agreements on its behalf.340 The bank, the principal, is thus bound by the actions of the agent 
and must ensure compliance with the Act - this is not the job of the agent.341 For the agency 
relationship to exists, the Bank is obliged to certify that:342 
- The agreement concluded by the agent is legal  
- The services of the agent are performed adequately, in accordance with the banks 
policies and the agreement concluded between the agent and client  
- Identify and deal with weaknesses that may arise in its supply of its service to the 
client  
- Provide SARB with any information on the activities of the agent 
 
This wide discretion afforded to banks allows for the provision of financial services outside 
of the traditional banking structure. Clients are given banking services that are subject to 
certain checks and balances, addressing the issue of accountability that often exists in 
informal structures. Furthermore, entities that have limited resources can use the agency 
agreement to leverage the benefits of infrastructure, compliance and skill.343 
 
It is submitted that in the context of Village Banks, the use of an agency agreement may be 
highly beneficial. Agents are permitted to act outside of the branch network, they can access 
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remote areas and provide financial services where they are lacking, which is where we often 
find Village Banks. One of the great advantages of this construct is the access to 
infrastructure, a huge issue present in the Village Bank system, where there is little support or 
guidance at local level.  
 
Furthermore, one of the issues associated with Village Banks is that there is little oversight of 
these institutions to ensure accountability. An argument for the use of an agency agreement is 
that the principal bank is required to ensure compliance, not only with its own policies but 
also with that of the SARB. The Bank is also supposed to provide support and remedy any 
weaknesses that it identifies in the process.344  
 
One can thus argue, that if Village Banks were to use this agency construct, they would be 
provided with far greater support and oversight than what is currently in place at government 
level. There are however drawbacks to this arrangement, such as the fact that the banks 
internal policies may be too stringent for compliance by a Village Bank or the fact that 
detailed records may be required by the SARB.  
 
As with most arguments for regulation of the informal economy, one must also keep in mind 
that there can be no easy fit that easily translates from informal to formal. This is a 
continuous project that requires cognisance to be taken of the diversity of these informal 
structures that are infused with local customs, habits and norms.  
 
c) Co-operatives legislation  
As stated in Chapter two, there is extensive legislation regulating the co-operatives sector 
comprising of both the Co-operatives Act345 and the Co-operative Banks Act.346 This 
legislation has been passed with several financial services in mind, including Village banks. 
It is mandated to provide oversight, regulation and support for this sector by creating the 
CDA.347 
 
It must be noted that, although good on paper, the current legislation has done little in reality 
to provide for assistance and support. These financial institutions remain largely unregistered 
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and are left to their own devices, with little to no government backing. 348 If this legislation 
were to be effective and the oversight bodies mandated by it were established, it is submitted 
that this would be a step in the right direction for the regulation of Village Banks.  
 
One of the main issues faced is the inadequacy of the registration system, which is said to be 
haphazard and highly convoluted.349 Registration is administered by CIPC, who lacks the 
resources and manpower to support the vast range of financial institutions.350Furthermore, the 
Registrar has its only office in Pretoria, which means that those conducting financial 
institutions in different provinces face the additional hurdle of gaining access.351 
 
With pockets of success, the overall impact of this legislation has had little to no bearing on 
the status quo.352 It is submitted that there be a call for a more integrated approach to co-
operatives and all financial institutions that are regulated by it. There cannot be one office, in 
one province that is responsible for all the administrative services required by the co-
operatives legislation. Thus, more resources need to be provided, either at national or 
provincial level, so that an administrative centre can be set up in each province.  
 
d) A dedicated body 
Schoombee353 has suggested, among other things, that a bank exclusively dedicated to serve 
the low income market be set up.354 He submits that the low profit expectations from this 
sector, inhibit big banks from taking on the project and instead there should be a move 
toward creating a bank dedicated to servicing the poor.355 This will, it is proposed, enable 
communities to save as well as have access to credit - which are services greatly required by 
the poor.  
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One way in which to do this is via the conduit of NGO’s, which should be upgraded by 
putting regulations in place in order to facilitate this process.356 A further, more preferred, 
method is the establishment of public-private sector partnerships whereby there is a 
commercially oriented NGO with a private investment company that specialises in 
microfinance.357 
 
By creating such a partnership, the extensive experience and resources of the private 
company can be utilised by the new bank in order to foster progress in the microfinance 
sector. Because big banks have been unsuccessful in incorporating informal, financial 
institutions as part of their services, there is scope for the aforementioned partnership to 
address the deficiencies posed by the formal banking system ie the stringent regulations.358 
 
Because the private sector firm should have microfinance knowledge, this will remedy the 
knowledge gaps faced both by the big banks as well as those who provide services at an 
informal level.359 The specialised private firm will provide the resources that are so 
inherently lacking in the development of the microfinance sector by approaching investors to 
fund the projects and train employees with their extensive knowledge of the sector.360 
 
Although a useful conduit to aid in the regulation of Village Banks, it is a vastly different 
model to that which is currently used. By using this method of regulation, one would 
essentially change the structure of the Village Bank, taking it away from the community and 
placing it in the hands of larger, more complex organisations. This takes away from the 
inherently informal and societal nature of these banks, which is, in fact, their very essence of 
them.  
 
It is submitted that there is a need for an injection of finance and knowledge into this sector 
in order for there to be development that is integrated and beneficial for the sector as a whole. 
By creating a dedicated body for the microfinance sector, it is submitted that the 
infrastructure and resources needed to further this sector will be gained.  
																																																						






Having an overarching support structure consisting of both public and private sector actors 
will benefit all these microfinance service providers. The government will however need to 
be complicit in this project, providing for incentives for private and public firms to get 
involved.361 Whatever regulations are put in place, they need to encourage the functioning of 
these institutions rather than place heavy compliance burdens on them - again an issue which 
is to be addressed by government.  
 
e) A hybrid approach  
This has been the popular rhetoric among microfinance authors in that supervising authorities 
are to function as private limited companies.362 Institutions that are registered with the 
requisite oversight body and conform to the regulations of the said body shall be granted 
exemptions under the Banks Act.363 It has been submitted that these exemptions should 
impose further limitations on these institutions such as that of the size and type of 
transactions.364 
 
The governing body of the supervising authority will be chosen by the members of the 
company ie the financial institutions that are registered with the company and a core staff 
complement will be appointed to run the daily functions of the company.365 The governing 
body will be responsible for registering, de-registering, imposing fines and general oversight 
of these financial institutions.366 
 
The proposal is that the supervising body will run at a total cost of R1.5 million to be 
financed by an application fee imposed on applying financial institutions.367 It is hoped that 
membership and accreditation fees, decreasing the reliance on government funding, will 
provide further funding.368 It is hoped that reliance on government resources will become less 
and less as more financial institutions register with the company, bringing in more 
application fees and thus diversifying their services.  
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This has been termed a hybrid approach because there is both an oversight body and 
membership participation. Although this may not be done at a community level, like in the 
case of most informal microfinance institutions, there is more participation compared to other 
modes of regulation whereby members are able to choose the governing body of the 
oversight authority. Thus, one can argue that although this is an oversight body which is 
under a Banks Act exemption, there is a degree of self-regulation in that members are able to 
elect those who oversee them.369 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Although Village Banks are in theory not wholly informal and there have been attempts by 
government to bring them into its sphere of control, they do for the most part remain self-
regulated.370 As stated in Chapter four, Village Banks operate at community level, using 
social structures, kinship and trust to manage these entities. At grassroots level, there is little 
to no government support or intervention and Village Banks are thus left to their own 
devices.  
 
While it is crucial that there be a degree of separation of the different financial services that 
operate at community level as they have different objectives. There is merit in the argument 
that duplication of regulatory authorities and oversight bodies are not warranted, as it requires 
a duplication of resources, which the government does not have.  
 
Oversight bodies serve a particularly important purpose in monitoring and providing support 
to microfinance institutions and if these oversight bodies are competent with the requisite 
credentials, it is submitted that they should be able to oversee numerous microfinance 
institutions to differing degrees.  
 
Of course, this presupposes an oversight body that is sufficiently financed and well 
resourced, having employees that are trained in the workings of an array of microfinance 
institutions. As it stands, we see a number of oversight bodies have been developed over the 
years, which although having pockets of success, have on the whole failed to address the 
needs of the different microfinance institutions in South Africa.  
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If legislation is the preferred method of regulation, it must be kept in mind that Village Banks 
and other similar entities are not homogenous and require some regulatory differentiation.371 
There can be no one size-fits-all solution and thus when rules are being made, the diverse 
nature of these entities needs to be kept in mind and catered for in the process. This is evident 
by the current conglomeration of financial entities covered by co-operative legislation, which 
has generally been unsuccessful in regulating or aiding these institutions. 
 
In order for regulation of these entities to hold any weight, proposed legislation must create 
the conditions for growth and confidence in these entities, in order to increase the prospects 
of investment as well as create legitimacy.372 Factors which need to be considered include: 
the number of members, the nature of transactions, the amount of risk, management control, 
the legal personality of the entity as well as the conditions within which these institutions 
operate.373 
 
Legislation and regulation cannot be divorced from the societal nature of these entities. It is 
thus imperative that traditional authorities and dispute resolution methods be observed as 
they form a crucial part of not only the community’s identity but also that of the Village Bank 
identity.  
 
It is evident that for these entities to expand and succeed, an effective oversight body is 
crucial. It is submitted that instead of reverting to extensive regulation and legislation, 
oversight bodies would be more effective in monitoring informal financial institutions in that 
they serve a more facilitative capacity. This, in turn, allows for these entities to function 
largely as they have been but with additional support and resources.  
 
Areas of support should include training in financial management, effective leadership and 
administration as well as assistance to establish new entities.374 It is also submitted that an 
oversight body would be able to lobby for these institutions at a national level with a 
collective voice in policy decisions that affect these entities. Furthermore, the oversight body 
would be tasked with simplifying and disseminating information received from government 
about these institutions and their development.  
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The focus is thus on support rather than regulation.375 The responsibility is more a 
developmental one, focused on capacity building and creating structures that will provide for 
the longevity of these institutions.376 The imposition of far-reaching legislation, which 
requires these membership-based institutions to jump through numerous hoops, is 
counterproductive and fails to provide for the interests that are served by these financial 
institutions.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As has already been stated, it is not preferred that Village Banks be extensively regulated by 
legislation and, rather, there should be an oversight body to provide assistance where needed. 
However, as it stands, there is no competent body that exists to regulate the governance and 
functioning of Village Banks. Those entities that do exist are under-resourced in terms of 
personnel, finances and training.  
 
It is submitted that there should be such an oversight body created to ensure the longevity and 
success of Village Banks as well as to preserve the integrity of their informal structure. This 
is however good in theory and it is evident that the government has neither the funds nor the 
resources to provide for such a body.  In this instance, the costs of regulation and compliance 
far outweigh any benefits, which may be associated with it, and thus these entities remain 
self-sustainable.377 I will set out my thoughts on how to improve upon the current regulatory 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION  
This dissertation has asked the question of whether the current regulation of Village Banks is 
sufficient. In doing this, insight into the operation of Village Banks and how they mediate 
with the formal financial sector has been provided.  By juxtaposing the formal sector 
legislation and informal sector practice, one can consider which is more effective in 
regulating and providing oversight of these entities.  
 
Formal financial institutions have failed to provide appropriate and adequate financial 
services to the poor.378 The stringent requirements set out by these banks and the high 
transaction costs associated with these institutions are barriers to access for the poor.379 Even 
those entities which have been created to mitigate these costs, are not as effective as one 
would hope because they suffer from institutional deficiencies, overregulation and lack of 
funding.  
 
For this reason, one sees the flourishing of the informal financial services sector is seen, 
which has been created to alleviate the flaws of formal banks. The Village Bank is one such 
institution that hopes to provide access to savings and, in some instances, credit, to those who 
cannot access it from the formal sector. 380 We know that these entities have the capability to 
provide financial services, the question is whether they should be incorporated into the 
formal sector via legislation and regulation.  
 
One of the key challenges facing regulation and supervision is finding the appropriate level to 
match the size and sophistication of these entities. Regulation that is too arduous, could 
hinder the functioning and development of Village Banks, while a more lenient approach 
may result in maladministration of these entities. It is important to ensure that these banks 
can assimilate to the communities within which they operate and so a one-size-fits-all 
approach is not appropriate.  
 
As previously stated, the benefits of regulating Village Banks needs to far surpass the 
drawbacks in order for it to be viable. There cannot be formalisation, for formalisation’s sake. 
There needs to be introspection as to why the argument to regulate these entities exists as 
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opposed to leaving them to their own devices, which, at present, is working for them and 
their clients.  
 
What is severely lacking is a body that provides support for the development and 
sustainability of Village Banks. Although funding would be ideal, this is not always possible 
and it is submitted that these banks require greater support in all areas. This means support in 
terms of training, information provision and representation at government level so that 
decisions about these entities are being made with input from those who experience them. 
 
As it stands, the oversight body381 currently tasked with overseeing several financial 
institutions, which is said to incorporate Village Banks, has done just about nothing to further 
the prospects of any of these institutions let alone Village Banks. 382 Lack of funding, 
coherence and management means that CDA is plagued with mediocrity and this coupled 
with its geographical inaccessibility to rural areas, has led to its ineptness.  
 
The ineffectiveness of this body is evident from the ethnographic accounts set out in Chapter 
four. In the reports set out, there is never a mention made of co-operative legislation nor the 
CDA, which is most probably due to the fact that the oversight bodies do not reach these 
vulnerable areas, where most Village Banks are situated.  
 
As was outlined in Chapter two, the history of regulation and the current attempts at bringing 
these entities into the formal sphere, have been unsuccessful. There has been a haphazard 
attempt by government to bring these entities into the formal sphere with the result being that 
Village Banks essentially operate regulation free, functioning at community level. With a 
lack of funding and training, it seems that the status quo will prevail and these banks will 
continue to operate as they always have, as quite successful, self-regulated entities that 
require no government intervention in their day-to day running.  
 
What is required is a via media approach whereby Village Banks are able keep a degree of 
self-regulation on a day-to-day level, with an overarching organisation to provide support and 
represent these entities at a national level. As it stands, these banks manage to fend for 
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themselves at community level where they make use of local structures and authorities to 
carry out their day-to-day functions.  
 
A supervising authority will provide guidelines; provide training and support to Village 
Banks at a micro-level. As previously stated, the emphasis should be on support, education 
and development, rather than regulation and compliance. By taking a more developmental 
approach, the focus should be on building up these institutions rather than requiring them to 
jump through hoops as set out in legislation.  
 
In order to establish such a body, the process needs to be consultative and cannot be handed 
to the Minister of Finance in his executive authority, like in the Co-operatives Act.383 
Consultation is imperative as there can be no oversight body that is effective without buy-in 
from the communities in which Village Banks operate. By garnering support from these 
entities, the oversight body will be better equipped to attend to the needs of the banks which, 
in turn, leads to sustainability of these institutions.  
 
It is further submitted, that this body would need to be made up of members of Village Banks 
and not just civil servants. Constant training and education of not only the members of 
Village Banks but also those in positions of power, is imperative as most people in South 
Africa are not skilled in the field of microfinance. The process of learning and development 
must be felt at all levels.  
 
It is evident that the South African formal financial sector needs great transformation. 
Although we have seen the number of ‘banked’ persons increase drastically, it is submitted 
that these statistics are not always an accurate reflection of the population’s dealings with 
financial services. Instead, as argued above, there is a vast percentage of the population that 
although seemingly served by the formal financial sector, interact with these services 
intermittently. 
 
This is where the informal sector has stepped in. By catering to the needs of the population 
that cannot afford financial services from formal banks, informal sector entities provide 
savings and credit services. It is essentially the people’s response to the inadequacies seen in 
																																																						
383 Op cit note 12. 
	 66	
the modern banking system and the pooling of accessible resources, that brings into focus the 







PRIMARY SOURCES  
 
Statutes  
Banks Act 94 of 1990 
Banks Act Circular 14/2004 on Outsourcing of Functions within Banks 
Co-operatives Amendment Act 6 of 2013 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Cooperative Act 14 of 2005 
Cooperative Banks Act 40 of 2007 
Government Notice 367, published in the Government Gazette 18741 of 10 March 1998. 
Mutual Banks Act 124 of 1993  






Armendariz, B & J. Morduch The Economics of Microfinance (2007) MIT Press, 
Massachusetts. 
Porteus, D & E.Hazelhurst Banking on Change (2004) Double Storey Books, Cape Town. 
Putnam, R.D Bowling Alone: The Collapse and revival of American Community (2000) 
Simon & Schuster, New York. 
 
Journal Articles  
Falke Moore, S ‘The legislative dismantling of a colonial and an apartheid state’ (2011) 7 
Annual Review of law and social science 1. 
 
Ferray, M ‘Trust and Social Capital in the Regulation of Lending Activities’ (2003) 31 
Journal of Socioeconomics 673.  
 
Geleta, EB ‘Social Capital as Collateral: Banking on the Poor’ (2014) 73 American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology 108.  
 
Hull, E ‘Banking in the Bush: waiting for credit in South Africa’s rural economy’ (2012) 82 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 168. 
 
James, D ‘Women use their strength in the house: savings clubs in a Mpumalanga Village’ 
(2015) 41 Journal of Southern African Studies 1035. 
 
Jones & Dallimore ‘Wither participatory banking? Experiences with village banks in South 
Africa’ (2009) 21 European Journal of Development Research 344. 
 
	 68	
Mashigo & Humayun ‘Village Banks: a financial strategy for developing the South African 
poor household’ (2016) 11 Banks and Bank systems 8. 
 
Meagher, K ‘Social Capital or Analytical liability? Social Networks and African Informal 
Economies’ (2005) 5 Global Networks 217.   
 
Sarkin, J ‘The Reshaping of the co-operatives legal architecture as a result of the 2013 
amendments to the 2005 Co-operatives Act: Promoting democratic governance and economic 
sustainability or control and overregulation?’ (2015) 27 South African Mercantile Law 
Journal 275. 
 
Yaron, J ‘What makes rural finance institutions successful?’ (1994) 9 The World Bank 
Research Observer 65. 
 
Theses 
Dallimore Banking on the Poor: Savings, Poverty and Access to Financial Services in Rural 
South Africa (PhD, London School of Economics 2013). 
 
Nigrini, N Analysis of Financial Service Cooperatives (unpublished Master of Commerce 
Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2005). 
 
Working papers and presentations  
Baland,J Somanathan,R & Wahhaj,Z: ‘Social sanctions and repayment incentives in group 
lending’, working paper No 192 from Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of 
Economics (2011). 
 
Buckland, J & W Simpson ‘Analysis of credit constraint and financial exclusion with 
Canadian microdata’ (2008) 7 at Presentation to Canadian Economics Association, Congress 
of the Humanities and Social Sciences.  
 
Coetzee & Cross “The role of community banks in South Africa: Can it contribute to improve 
access to financial services for the poor?” (2002) Working paper: Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Extension and Rural Development. University of Pretoria, South Africa.  
 
Schoombee. "South African Banks and the Unbanked: Progress and Prospects" at Biennial 
Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa. Somerset West: University of 
Stellenbosch, 2004. 
 








‘Underbanked versus Banked: an insight into the South African Retail Banking sector and 
reasons for high percentage of the unbanked population’ available at 
http://traderoot.weebly.com/blog/under-banked-vs-unbanked. 
	 69	
CIPC ‘Registering your Co-operative’ Available at http://www.cipc.co.za/index.php/register-
your-business/co-operatives/types-co-operatvies/. 
 
Coetzee, G ‘Regulation and supervision of Microfinance Institutions: The experience in 
South Africa’ Available at 
http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/48/2052/coetzee1.pdf.  
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) ‘Updates on Regulation of Branchless 
Banking in South Africa’ (2010) available at https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-
Regulation-of-Branchless-Banking-in-South-Africa-Jan-2010.pdf page 3. 
 








FinMark Trust ‘Third Tier Banking Report: A review of the capacity, lessons learned and 
way forward for member-based financial institutions in South Africa’ (2003) available at 
http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ThirdTierBanking.pdf. 
 
FinMark Trust ‘Understanding Financial Co-operatives: South Africa, Malawi and 
Swaziland’ (2014) available at  http://www.finmark.org.za/sites//wp-
content/uploads/pubs/Rep_Financial-Co-operatives_20142.pdf. 
 
Finmark Trust (2016) http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/finscope-
south-africa-2016-leave-behind.pdf. 
 
Freedom from Hunger available at https://www.freedomfromhunger.org,  
 
Grameen Research Inc ‘Grameen Methodology’ Available at 
http://grameenresearch.org/grameen-methodology-2. 
 
Hatch, J ‘A Brief Primer on FINCA’ available at: 
http://www.haas.berkley.edu/haasglobal/events_microfinanceos.html. 
 
International Co-operatives Alliance ‘Co-operative identity, values and principles’ available 
at https://ica.coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles. 
 









National Treasury, Republic of South Africa ‘A Safer Financial Sector to serve South Africa 




National Treasury, Republic of South Africa ‘Budget Review: 2017’ available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2017/review/Annexure%20F.pdf. 
 
Nigrini, M ‘Empowering Poor rural villages through the provision of financial services by 
means of financial service cooperatives: A preliminary investigation into financial service 
cooperatives in South Africa.’ Paper read at International Jubilee Conference of the 







Oxford Business Group ‘South African banks making efforts to reach and integrate the 
unbanked population’ available at https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/analysis/final-20-
reaching-unbanked-population-complex-task. 
 
Rose, R ‘Measures of social capital in African surveys’ available at 
http://www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk,  
 




The Department of Agriculture, forestry and fisheries ‘Co-operative and Enterprise 
Development’ available at http://www.daff.gov.za/daffweb3/Branches/Economic-
Development-Trade-Marketing/Co-operatives-and-Enterprise-Development. 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry website available at 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/default.jsp. 
 















This receipt acknowledges that Turnit in received your paper. Below you will f ind the receipt
inf ormation regarding your submission.
The f irst page of  your submissions is displayed below.
Katy Bolton









Copyright 2018 Turnitin. All rights reserved.
g:\ghu\forms\m-receipt 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
 FACULTY OF LAW 
 
DECLARATION FORM  -- MASTERS DEGREE CANDIDATES 
Title:  MISS Student No:  BLTKAT001 
Name, 




result can be 
posted)  
84 RIVER ROAD 
WALMER 
PORT ELIZABETH (6070) 
Telephone 
No’s:  0763775991   
Email 




Formalising the Informal: the ‘fate’ of Village Banks  
 
 
Name of Supervisor: ANDREW HUTCHISON  
Word count:                                                                                                          22817 No. of pages 70 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES: 
• Candidates for graduation in June and December may expect to receive notification of the 
outcome of the examination of the dissertation as published in the Grad information booklet and 
last week in November, respectively, provided the dissertation was submitted by the due date. 
Where a dissertation has been submitted well in advance of the due date, earlier notification will 
be given, if possible. However, the University does not undertake to reach a decision by any 
specific date.  
• Candidates who are required to revise and re-submit for re-examination are required to register 
during the revision phase.  Fees will be calculated according to the date of notification of your 
revise and re-submit result and the date of re-submission.  (Faculty to send copy of letter 
advising candidate of R&R result to Fees.) 
• Candidates are asked to note that the University will not permit degree/diploma qualifiers to 
graduate if they have any outstanding fees, fines, interest or dues. The final date for payment 
of outstanding amounts is 30 April in the case of qualifiers for June graduation and 31 
October in the case of qualifiers for December graduation.  
• Please note that should your examination process run into the following year, you will have to 





1. I am presenting this dissertation in PARTIAL fulfilment of the requirements for my 
degree. 
2. I know the meaning of plagiarism and declare that all of the work in the dissertation, save 
for that which is properly acknowledged, is my own.  
3. I hereby grant the University of Cape Town free licence to reproduce for the purpose of 
research either the whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever of the 
above dissertation.  
Signature   Date:  19th February 2018 
 
 
FUNDING AND FEES:  
 
Candidates who submit have a choice in regards fee and funding options:  
a.) to claim a fee rebate and discontinue funding through the PGFO (the student  remains 
registered until graduation or the next academic year, see rule G5.2),  
b.) to remain registered and engaged in the department while writing up a paper, with full 
student rights and full access to facilities, full liability for the fees for the year, and 
eligibility for continued (awarded) funding for that academic year.  
 
Please indicate your preference 
 
To claim a fee rebate and discontinue funding and physical & library access*  
To continue fee liability, and funding eligibility and access to all facilities   
 
*Students asking for a fee rebate acknowledge  
a.) the implications of the fee rebate on their access to facilities and eligibility for funding, 
and; 
b.) that if they were to stay on in the department and receive payment though the payroll, 
such payment is taxable.  
 




FOR COMPLETION BY FACULTY OFFICE  
I acknowledge receipt of three bound copies and an electronic version (Disk) of the 
dissertation/research paper of the above candidate:  
 
Signature   Date:   
Abstract submitted Yes No 
cc Fees, IAPO, PGFO,  Student Housing 
